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SOME THINGS THAT MAY BE MORE IMPORTANT TO
UNDERSTAND ABOUT ORGANIZED CRIME THAN COSA NOSTRA
DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR.*

This article analyzes the problems in developing a real definition of
organized crime within the context of its use as a starting point for costeffectiveness analysis. The limitation of conventional definitions are reviewed, with particular attention being given to the significance of understanding Cosa Nostra as a key to understanding organized crime. As an
alternative to that approach, some questions are posed that may lead to
more useful conclusions about organized crime than the conventional assumptions concerning Cosa Nostra.
THE CosT oF ORGANIZED CRIME

Why should anyone be concerned about the notion of organized crime?
Various contemporary observers have attempted to answer this question, but
the only dear consensus that emerges is that reasons can be advanced to
satisfy any reader's predispositions toward anxiety., If one wished to catalogue the "threats" that have been identified, the resulting list would range
from economic and social concerns, through political apprehensions, to moral and philosophical dread. The common thread to be observed in all the
answers, aside from a concentrated focus on the "bad guys" epitomized by
the Crime Commission's references to Italians, 2 is a high proportion of pejorative exhortation in relation to-the amount of objective analysis and factual proof provided to support the conclusions set forth.
There is one concern about orgainzed crime that has not been explored
to any great extent: the concern of the taxpayer who looks for assurance that
his involuntary contributions to the support of organized crime control
have been well spent. The plight of the taxpayer is generally linked to the
argument that organized criminals amass illicit fortunes on which no taxes
*Director of Institutional Research, State University of New York at Albany; Visiting
Associate Professor of Police Science, John Jay College of Criminal Justice.
1. See THE PREsmENr's COMMISSION ON LAw ENFoRcEmmNT AND ADMINmIRATION OF
JusicE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME (1967) [hereinafter cited as CRUM COMMISSION] which lists five separate "dangers" or "threats" of organized crime. See also D.
CR sEy, THEFT OF THE NATION (1969) [hereinafter cited as D. CRESSEY] which lists six.
2. "Today the core of organized crime in the United States consists of 24 groups
operating as criminal cartels in large cities across the Nation. Their membership is exdusively men of Italian descent ......CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 6,
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are paid, thus increasing the relative burden on the less affluent, honest
citizen. This argument, however, is unsupported by even a theoretical model
of the economy of an illicit enterprise that would show its relationship to
the licit economy. Without such a model we remain at the mercy of "guesstimates" as to the disproportionate share of government support shouldered
by the honest taxpayer. Similarly, no effort has been made to compare the
potential (or theoretical) loss of revenue through the tax evasion of organized criminals with the loss of revenue resulting from the tax avoidance
of legitimate businesses. Some important questions remain to be explored
here. For example: Is my disproportionate share of the tax burden made
heavier because the men who operate the numbers rackets in New York City
are not reporting income and thus avoiding taxes, or because oil companies
have depletion allowances written into their tax returns? Of equal importance should be our concern for a return on the taxes we do pay for organized
crime control.
The problem of organized crime control has not been posed in this
fashion before. In the past, attention has been focused on developing a
sufficiently persuasive rationale to justify both legislative authorization of
certain tactical weapons3 and sufficient funding of programs that will eliminate organized crime. The rationale has been presented largely in military
terms: organized crime is an "enemy" and it is to be dealt with through a
1$War.-4

This approach has its limits, not the least of them being that conventional military thinking is not attuned to the conceptual approach of costeffectiveness analysis. An enemy seldom has a price tag. The commanding
general is motivated by the objective of inflicting more punishment on the
enemy than can be reciprocated, rather than by whether the cost of inflicting
the punishment is greater than the ultimate benefit to his side. 5
3. E.g., wiretapping, revised court rules, limitations on activities of members of organized
crime.

4. For one of the earliest treatments of this approach, see R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY
(1960). A more recent Washington comment referred to the Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1970 as giving the federal government the means "to launch a total war against
organized crime, and we will end this war." See N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1970, at 18, col I.
5. A cost-effectiveness analysis would have to investigate both positive and negative
values associated with organized crime and its control. This is a difficult undertaking for
law enforcement personnel raised on the philosophy that "the good guys wear white hats."
To illustrate that difficulty: In the past two years I have asked my seminar students to
prepare, on successive weeks, informal essays discussing "The Threats of Organized Crime"
and "The Benefits of Organized Crime." The first essay appeared to be relatively easy to
prepare, without any need for qualification; but even the thought of the second essay
has provoked severe intellectual problems for some students. In 1969 over half the class
could not discuss "benefits" without an accompanying disclaimer statement, exhorting the
reader to remember that the dangers of organized crime were far worse than any paltry,
theoretical benefits. The problem was most noticeable among students who were senior
police officers and who had previously been assigned to special vice control squads. The
difficulty was apparent even though the "benefits" assignment accompanied assigned
reading of Gardiner, Wincanton: The Politics of Corruption, in CRIME CoMMIssION, supra
note 1, at 61-79.
WrrHxN
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Nonetheless, it may be that cost-effeotiveness analysis is inappropriate
in organized crime control. Many of the concerns associated with that area
of enforcement are intangible and objectives of a control program may be
impossible to associate with numerical values. Furthermore, although the
process of criminal justice may be inherently sequential and continuous, it
becomes operative through a system of criminal justice, which is ordinarily
dysfunctional, often bewildering and discordant, and sometimes even irrational. 6 The law enforcement agency may effectively investigate organized
crime and may allocate its resources well for that task; but its efforts may be
thwarted by subsequent action based on conflicting objectives of another administrative unit within the criminal justice system. Despite these limitations, the process of undertaking a cost-effectiveness analysis might well be
profitable, even if the concept is not adopted as a permanent evaluation
tool. The attempt to apply it would require a more concrete specification
of the nature of the problem, and of the objectives to be sought in relation
to it, than has yet taken place. Clarification of public policy is desirable
in any event; in this case, it would undoubtedly improve the law enforcement
community's ability to tackle its share of the problem.
If a consensus were reached on the desirability of exploring a cost-effectiveness approach to organized crime control, the first -task would be to
define the problem of organized crime. To the casual reader of popular literature on the subject, this would not seem to be a difficult task. He might
well conclude that with-so many studies of "the problem" available, including one by a Presidential commission, the nature of organized crime and the
directions in which its remedies lie must surely be dear by now. 7 Unfortunately, this is not the case. Because organized crime has not been well defined, remedies have been proposed that entail considerable law enforcement activity but little hope of resolving the problem. If one looks dosely
at what has been written about the nature of organized crime, the reasons
for the definitional deficiency become dear. In simple terms, the characteristics that have been cited as keys to "understanding" organized crime are not
the right keys at all. They open doors that lead down dimly lit paths to
cul-de-sacs, while the reality of organized crime continues down the main
line, unimpeded. "Understanding" is needed; but of the real phenomena,
accurately defined.
TIE PROBLEM OF DEXINION

Assuming that there is a valid category of persons and events that can be
called organized crime, it is apparent that there are three ways of approach6. For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between "process" and "system,"
see The Information Requirements of Criminal Justice Administration, in NEw Yoan. STATE
IDENTIFICATION AND INTELLIGENcE SYsrEM, A NEw CONCEPT IN INFoRMATIoN-SHARING

13-20

(1967).
7. The CRIME CommissION, supra note 1, devoted nearly ten pages (1-10) describing
the nature of organized crime, and an almost equal apalant Qf space (at 16-24) to suggesting
remedies.
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ing it: as a social phenomenon, to be analyzed and understood; as an illegally
defined act, or state of being, for which a person can be prosecuted; and as
a popular concept, to be communicated to the public.
These approaches are interrelated and cannot be considered apart from
each other. Nevertheless, an adequate social definition must precede a legal
definition if the latter is to have any enforcement value, and similarly, both
the social and legal definitions must support the popular concept 8
This is not what has happened. Popular notions have been adopted as
the basis for attempts at legal definitions. The popular notions are so burdened with stereotypes that it has been virtually impossible to undertake
the necessary objective analysis that would produce an adequate social definition.
What are those stereotypes? As a sample, consider the results of an exercise that introduces the seminar on "Organized Crime in America" at the
John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Without prior conditioning, students
were asked to list the first ten responses evoked by the phrase "organized
crime." The composite response of the ten terms most frequently mentioned
in the last two years, in the order in which they occurred, was as follows: 9
Mafia, money, Italian, Cosa Nostra, gambling, narcotics, prostitution, organization, corruption, murder.
When forced to go beyond their immediate reactions, the students suggested other aspects of organized crime. Nonstereotype images such as interlocking businesses, control of industry, profit, affluence, supply, demand,
and cross-country travel were mentioned. The trouble with these images,
of course, is that they could be used just as well to describe a decent, lawabiding, upperworld, white, Anglo-Saxon member of the legitimate business
community. This bothers many who have accepted the popular stereotypes that
identify a group of social outcasts who do things for their own benefit to an
innocent and unsuspecting public.
A colloquy in New Jersey a year ago demonstrated the unhappiness that
emerges in the absence of expected stereotypes. It occurred as the state supreme court heard arguments from lawyers questioning the power of the fledgling State Investigation Commission to compel testimony about organized
crime by conferring immunity from prosecution upon witnesses. During
the arguments Chief justice Joseph Weintraub pressed one of the lawyers
for an explanation of the Cosa Nostra: 10
8. The interrelationship of social and legal definitions is explored in some detail by
D. CRESsEY, supra note 1, at 299-305. Unfortunately, he deals separately with the problem
of the popular definition and thus misses the interrelationship of all three. Id. at 54-71.
9. I obtained 632 responses from the 65 students who participated in this exercise (some
found the 9th and 10th responses difficult to articulate). Of this total, 209 were words or
concepts expressed only once; the remaining responses were comprised of multiple listings
of 80 words or phrases. The 10 listed here were mentioned 212 times, or one-third of the
total responses. The order shown was derived by giving a value of 10 to the 1st word
listed by each respondent and I to the 10th word listed, and by averaging the resulting
score by the total listings of the word. By this calculation, "Mafia" (mentioned 37 times)
had an average value of 8.8; "murder" (mentioned 11 times) had an average value of 4.6.
10. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1969, at 50, col. 2.
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The lawyer denied he had any personal knowledge of organized crime.
But based on "what [he had] heard and studied," he gave this description: "The Cosa Nostra is supposed ito be a group of people
banded together for selfish purposes to make money any way they can,
with the emphasis on illegal means."
"That sounded like General Motors up until the last part," Justice Weintraub replied, drawing laughter from a packed courtroom.
What is organized crime -really? The stereotypes that form the concept
amount to what Walter Lippman described years-ago as "the pictures inside
people's heads [of] the world outside.""l If the pictures do not reflect reality,
the definitions constructed to categorize them will be misleading.
Are the popular images of Mafia, Italian, and Cosa Nostra the reality of
organized crime, or are they, in the imagery of Plato's famous allegory, simply shadows cast on the back wall of a cave by puppets held between our
backs and the firelight at the entrance to the cave? Is the reality of organized
crime a group of persons working together? Is it the activities they engage
in - gambling, narcotics, extortion, murder, prostitution, usury? Is it a
corporate-like structure built for illegal activities, but with significant and
distinctive characteristics? Is it a series of basically independent social problems in which a particular group of entrepreneurs can be observed? Or is
it a social phenomenon, generated by the demands of our society, and extending well beyond the cast of characters and the list of activities normally
associated with it? Strikingly different definitions can be written for organized crime, depending on what is considered to be real about it.
Beyond the problem of stereotypes, a second barrier to understanding
organized crime is a preoccupation with the criminality of it. Too much
emphasis is placed on "crime" and not enough on "organized." While Professors Cressey and Schelling have both attempted to penetrate this barrier,
with Schelling's effort being the more successful, 2 the barrier is still there.
It encourages an assumption that the law stands in the middle of a large
gulf separating legitimate and illegitimate activities. Consequently, no matter what point of departure is chosen, the generally perceived reality of
organized crime distinguishes between criminals and law-abiding persons
as being somehow inherently different; or between criminal activities as
being of a different order from legitimate activities; or between criminal
organizations as being different in both structure and operations from legitimate organizations.
Another barrier to a satisfactory definition is the focus on one side of
the matter- the persons who commit organized crime. To be sure, there
is recognition of the concept of the willing victim and of the distinction
between predatory and service crimes. Despite those concepts, mental images
are maintained of organized crime that have no relationship to its environ-

11. W. LipPMAN, PUsuC OPINION 31 (1922).
12. Perhaps his advantage lies in being an economist rather than a criminologist. See
D. CaEssr, supra note 1; Schelling, Economic Analysis and Organized Crime, in Cam
CoMMissioN, supra note 1, at 114.
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ment; it appears as a force with its own motive power and an independently
contrived raison d'etre.
The result of this approach has been -the development of a "Mafia mystique," which came forcefully to the surface with the Crime Commission's
comments about Italians, but reached its peak with Cressey's statement that
"if one understands Cosa Nostra he understands organized crime in the
United States."' 3 Coincidentally, Puzo's bestseller,14 The Godfather, provided the basis for a popular notion of Italian dominated syndicate crime
that reinforced the official position of the Crime Commission. The cumulative effect on such declarations and fantasies prompted an unprecedented
spurt of news articles that reinforced the mystique by reporting on "The
15
Mafia" in relation to law enforcement activities against organized crime.
The popular, public inquiry of the press was in high gear until the Attorney General prohibited the use of the terms Mafia and Cosa Nostra by the
Justice Department. 16 While his order temporarily affected the frequency of
public references to these ethnically-identifiable labels, there is nothing to
indicate that official beliefs have changed noticeably. "Cherchez les Italiens"
still appears to be the principal 'theme of organized crime control.",
At the heart of that policy lies Cressey's detailed, though admittedly
speculative, elaboration of the structure and functions of syndicated crime
in the United States. His opponents, notably Morris and Hawkins, have con13. D. CR.ssmy, supra note 1, at 21.
14. M. Puzo, THE GODFATHER (1969).
15. The New York Times Index listings under the heading "Mafia" show the name
enjoyed some notoriety during the Kefauver hearings (13 listings in 1951) and again at
the time of the McClellan hearings and the Appalachin meeting (16 and 13 entries, respectively, in 1958 and 1959). In intervening years, and after 1959, interest in "Mafia" almost
disappeared from the newspaper. Since the Valachi revelations, "Mafia" has been a standard
reference, with occasional cross-listings to "Cosa Nostra" and "Crime Syndicate." The following table indicates that the number of index listings was increasing arithmetically until
the appearance of the Crime Commission report in 1967.
Year
1963
1964
1965
1966

Index Listings
Under "Mafia"
18
17
40
60

Year
1967
1968
1969
1970, Jan.-June
July-Dec.
1971, Jan.-June

Index Listings
Under "Mafia"
104
127
285
185
85
117

16. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1970, at 28, col. 4.
17. "[E]xcept when speaking for quotations, Federal investigators and state law enforcement officers continue to use the terms "Mafia" and "Cosa Nostra." The Federal agents,
including those in the F.B.I., believe their position reflects the view of Mr. Hoover ...."
Crutzner, Dispute over "Mafia," N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1970, at 24, col. 2. This view may not
be held by all law enforcement personnel, however. "Alfred J. Scotti, chief assistant district
attorney of Manhattan, took issue with [Bronx District Attorney Burton B. Roberts'] use
of the word Mafia, saying that in his 23 years in the district attorney's office 'I've never
come across any evidence that would indicate that these groups [or] families operate as
members of the Mafia.'" See N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1970, at 15, col. 1.
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tended that his analysis is an over elaboration based more on myth than on
justifiable speculation; they conclude that whatever lies behind the events
normally categorized as organized crime can be eliminated if we "remove the
criminal laws which both stimulate and protect it."' 8
While both sides of this argument may be partially correct, neither is
a satisfactory approach to the problem of organized crime control. Their
primary concern is with establishing, or challenging, Cosa Nostra as the key
to understanding organized crime, when in reality it is an intellectual impasse. It is doomed at the outset because its origins are in contemporary
stereotypes, a preoccupation with criminality, and a focus on perpetrators
alone.
This concern for an accurate definition of organized crime is more than
an abstract search for "Truth." A definition of a particular category of behavior will specify what is different about that category, what significant
factors are common to a class of actions, and what factors separate the behavior covered by the category from other forms of behavior. If the category being defined is a criminal one, there will be a presumption that the
differences have negative connotations. This is the case with organized
crime: it is distinguished from other activities by unpopular behavior. But
more importantly the activities categorized as organized crime are alleged
to be the cause of a moral decay that is of considerable danger to American
life.
Three serious problems of analysis appear at this point. First: Is Cosa
Nostra so synonymous with organized crime that its elimination would
signal the end of -the phenomenon? Second: Are the activities identified as
organized crime the totality of -the causes of the decay in American life so
that its elimination would eliminate this decay? Third: Are the activities
that should properly be grouped as organized crime the cause of the threats
identified with it, or merely its symptoms? The campaign against organized
crime entails significant compromises with the balance between group security and individual privacy that existed even a decade ago; for the risks
that organized crime control asks us to take, the underlying categorization
and explanation of the phenomena under examination must be unequivocally sound. An inadequate definition process will not assure that soundness.
If this is the case, how should the problem of defining organized crime
be approached? Very simply: by not looking for organized crime itself. As
a contrived concept, at least in contemporary usage,1 9 it does not possess
its own logic, but requires interpretation from a variety of viewpoints. The
question is not: "What is organized crime?" Rather, the question is: "What
insights may be obtained from history, economics, sociology, psychology even philosophy and 'theology - that would facilitate efforts to understand
18. N. MoPus & G. HAWKINs, TmE HONEsr PoLrrITAN's GuaDE To CRIME CONTROL 235
(1970).
19. There is a considerable difference between contemporary references to organized
crime and the conceptual approach intended by John Landesco in his original use of the
phrase. See J. Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, in ILLINOIS CRIME SuRvEy, pt. 3, at
221 (1929). (Part 3 was reissued in 1968, with a Foreword by Mark Hailer).
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why the phenomena we categorize as organized crime occur, and what forces
trigger their occurrence?"
THE "COSA NOSTRA SYNDROME"

It is important to note that the alternative approach just described has
been suggested previously, but has not yet been tried. Cressey drew attention
to it in the concluding paragraph of his paper for the Crime Commission
by saying: "New questions, different from those traditionally raised by police and prosecutors must be asked, and new evidence relating to the answers
to those questions must be assembled." 20 While Theft of The Nation, an
outgrowth of his paper, was an attempt to do just that, it has fallen short
of the mark. Two noticeable changes in conceptual approach may account
for this.
First, the suggestion that "New questions . ..must be asked" was linked

to a plea that police intelligence files be opened -to social science researchers
from outside the law enforcement community. In turn, these suggestions
were related to an earlier conclusion that: "What is needed is detailed and
precise specification, by social scientists, law enforcement personnel, and
legislators working together, of the formal and informal structures of illicit
governments and businesses." 21 Contrast that conclusion with the manner in
22
which it was restated in the book that followed:
We propose that social scientists, systems engineers, law-enforcement
personnel, and legislators work together, probably in a new agency
within the United States Department of Justice, to specify in detail
the formal and informal structures of the illicit governments and businesses traditionally lumped together as "organized crime."
The proposal that "New questions . . . be asked" was not restated nor was

the idea that intelligence files be made available to researchers. Rather, the
explanatory comments immediately following the suggestion of a new agency
within the Justice Department appears to have reversed the original intent:23
Implicit in this proposal is the suggestion that a cadre of policemen be
broadly trained for organized-crime work .... It is high time that some
policemen be trained as organized crime specialists, and that their
training include general studies of the kind now necessary for military
leadership.
In this form, Cressey's suggestion appears to head toward the Crime Commission's comments concerning the development of strategic intelligence;24

20. Cressey, The Functions and Structure of Criminal Syndicates, in CRImE COMMISSMON,
supra note 1, at 60.
21. Id. at 57.
22. D. CRSSEY, supra note 1, at 297.
23. Id. at 297-98.
24. CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 15.
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but it is difficult to imagine how this approach could facilitate the asking
of "New questions, different from those traditionally raised by police .. . .,,5
Second, early in his discussion of the nature of organized crime, Cressey
considered "[t]he problem of assigning a name to the American confederation of criminals." 26 He described the discussions that took place at the 1965
Oyster Bay Conferences on Combating Organized Crime, and the conclusion then reached that "Confederation" was the best term to use. Although not
perfectly descriptive, it had the advantage, according to the conferees, of
being sufficiently free from local terminology to be usable in the interjurisdictional setting. It did not mean that the conferees rejected any ethnic
identification of organized crime; undoubtedly, most of them said "Confederation" but thought "Italian." They had in mind a "loosely knit conspiracy, which is Italian dominated ....
"27 On the other hand, it is apparent
that they wished to leave room for a wider focus on the problem: "Practically
all students of organized crime are agreed that this organization does not
represent the total or organized crime .... "28 In his paper for the Crime
Commission, Cressey adopted this approach. Although clearly describing a
structure based on existing theories of "Mafia" and "Cosa Nostra," he referred
to it throughout his paper as "Confederation."
With the publication of Theft of the Nation, however, a change occurred.
His earlier description of the Oyster Bay discussion is recapitulated, with
some side observations interpol-ated;29 it is followed immediately, however,
by a supplemental comment not in ,the original paper: 30
We are satisfied that "Cosa Nostra" is as good as any other term
While Cosa Nostra still tolerates some major operations by criminals of
ethnic backgrounds which are not Sicilian or Italian, if one understands Cosa Nostra he understands organized crime in the United
States.
In the remaining discussion "Confederation" is replaced throughout by
"Cosa Nostra." 31 This change in name is unfortunate. It restricts Cressey's
later analysis - most of which is quite useful in a speculative sense - to

25. Cressey, supra note 20, at 60. The development of strategic intelligence resources
within the agency responsible for ultimate action is risky. "Intelligence must be close enough
to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, and must not be
so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity of judgment." S. KENT, STRATEGIc INTEL1.GENCE

180 (1951).

26. Cressey, supra note 20, at 27.
27. Id. at 28.
28. Id.
29. D. CREssEY, supra note 1, at 16-20.
30. Id. at 20-21.
31. With few exceptions the only significant one of which -is noted above, (see text
accompanying notes 21-23 supra), the entire paper is incorporated into the remainder of
the book, with the addition of supplemental material based largely on now-public material
obtained by law enforcement agencies through wiretap or "overhear" devices. The change
in name noted here is the only substantive modification of the earlier Crime Commission
material not previously noted.
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what can be understood about organized crime if one is limited ,to previously
established notions of the law enforcement community. That perspective
contains little room for "new questions."
WHAT SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND

ABOUT

ORGANIZED CRIME?

Since there has not yet been a sustained, systematic search for new understandings about organized crime, no firm assurances can be given that
the lines of inquiry suggested here will turn out, in the long run, to have
been correct ones to follow. Nevertheless, some promising starting points
can be identified and pursued briefly. The ultimate goal in each case is
knowledge that will contribute generally to organized crime control.
What Is the Role of Illicit Enterprise in American Life?
The choice of a name other than "organized crime" is a deliberate effort
to escape from a concept so overburdened -Aith stereotyped imagery that it
cannot meet the basic requirements of a definition - it does not include all
the phenomena that are relevant; it does not exclude all the phenomena that
are not relevant; and it does not provide a sufficient framework for taxonomic description. 32 "Enterprise" is preferable -to "activity" because the phenomena in question have objectives that are entrepreneurial in nature. "Illicit"
is preferable to "criminal" because, in the present discussion, it establishes
a less pejorative base for analysis, and because it can be distinguished in
an economic sense from "licit." The antonym of "criminal" is the legal alternative "civil" - a less useful distinction for the purposes of the present
analysis.
Implicit in the question being posed is an assumption that social and
economic behavior can be depicted as a continuous distribution, "ranging
from [the] very saintly to the most sinful." 33 If this be -the case, there is
no clear distinction between so-called "astute business practices" and illicit
practices; the entrepreneur faced with the right mix of competetive stresses and undetectable (or at least low risk) opportunity may shift his behavior toward the "bad" or "sinful" end of the scale.
Conventional descriptions of organized crime appear to operate from a
different assumption - that activities such as gambling, loansharking, union
racketeering and drug trafficking are distinctive in character from "legitimate business" and operate according to different cultural values. The distinction becomes most apparent when the threat of organized crime is found
to be its "infiltration of legitimate business,"3 4 or its "culture of fraud, corruption, violence, and murder." 35
32. See Schelling, supra note 12, at 115-17. Schelling attempted such a taxonomic description, to explain "why some underworld business becomes organized and some remains
unorganized." Id. at 115.
33.
34.
35.

L. WILKINS, SOCIAL DEVIANCE 46-47 (1965).
CIME COMMISSION supra note 1, at 4.
D. CRmEY, supra note 1, at 1.
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Is the distinction between the upperworld and underworld that clear, or
is there one world in fact, in which illicit enterprises, which have dear and
often accepted roles, are linked to licit enterprises by functional similarity
and by practices that evidence only the subtlest of distinctions? Is loansharking, for example, really a distinctive enterprise, or is it an extension of the
banking business beyond legally permissible rates of interest with functionally identical problems of credit review, collection and default, loan conditions, customer satisfaction? Is the loansharking enterprise based on forcing
otherwise reluctant customers to deal with it, or on the opportunity for
relatively low-risk profit from individuals or enterprises that cannot obtain
credit from legal sources? Is the threat of violence the force that inhibits
the borrower from defaulting, or is it the potential loss of a credit line that
impels repayment?
It may be somewhat unfair to impute as heavy an emphasis on an upperunder world distinction to contemporary organized crime writings as these
questions seem to do. Salerno and Tompkins refer often to the functional and
operating "correspondence between United States business and organized
crime."38 At the same time, a distinction is drawn between organized crime
and legitimate business that assumes a sharp demarcation between the two: 3 7
The difference between organized crime and a large corporation is
that a company may use sharp, and even unfair, business practices in
moving ahead of the competition, but it does not try to capture a
share of market with a gun or dub. It sells by persuasion, competition,
service, and ideas rather than extortion. And many companies' violations of antitrust, labor, tax, food and drug and other laws are inadvertant rather than systematic.38
When the principal frame of reference shifts from a stereotyped cast of
persons operating in a separate world of crime to illicit enterprises at one
end of a continuous spectrum of business activity, it becomes dear that more
is involved than the events and persons conventionally identified as organized crime. Such activities as price-fixing, "blockbusting," fraudulent sales,
and contract payoffs- perhaps even "confficts of interest . . . in connection
with the organization and operation of unregistered investment partnerships"3 - are also part of illicit enterprise. To make sense of this larger
category, a typology, accompanied by a list of distinguishing characteristics,
would be required. For example, while all activities properly identified as
illicit enterprise apparently entail conspiracy, do they also require corruption? Is violence a common characteristic? Do they all represent the same
dangers to society in terms of illegal accumulation of wealth, neutralization
56. R. SALERNO & J. ToMPKINs, THE CRIME CONFEDERATION 101 (1969).
57. Id. at 203-04.
38. The distinction insisted upon here is a curious one, considering that only two pages
earlier the Chicago jukebox industry is described in terms of politeness, service, and persuasion, as an example of how "the soft sell has taken hold in Chicago, the last stronghold
for rampant violence." Id. at 200-01.
39. Stelger, Secret Report on Wall St. Abuses, N.Y. Post, Dec. 8, 1970, at 4, col. 2.
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of law enforcement, and subversion of "the very decency and integrity that
are the most cherished attributes of a free society"? 4 It may well be that
within a correct typology of illicit enterprise, conventional organized crime
activities remain clustered and, in the final analysis, they may be the largest
single grouping within the larger category. However, other and perhaps unexpected companions will also emerge, and an understanding of the category as a whole may provide a clearer and more convincing explanation
of the origins and significance of any of its subjects. From the standpoint
of law enforcement, it may also have the practical advantage of providing
a clearer relationship between the functions of an Organized Crime and
Racketeering Division and other regulatory agencies.
This line of inquiry may provide a better explanation for the vexing
problem often characterized as the "fabric of society" question. As Salerno
and Tompkins put it: "Organized crime . . . is so thoroughly woven into

the fabric of our society that we no longer recognize it as special or different,
immensely wealthy or powerful."41 This statement assumes that organized
crime was once a separate entity, not inherent in American life (else, why
note that "we no longer recognize it as special"). As such, the further assumption is that it can be divorced from American life if the right approach is
taken. The essence of the ensuing strategy is to eliminate organized crime
by eliminating the group of persons who engage in it. If, on -the other hand,
illicit enterprises, including those activities usually categorized as organized
crime, are a natural outgrowth of our economic structure, then the assumption that an attack on its purveyors will lead to its demise is questionable
and an entirely different strategy may be called for.
Another potential advantage of this line of inquiry is that it may lead
to a successful search for historic parallels and the insights they may provide. The present-day focus on Italian dominated syndicate crime as
synonymous with organized crime assumes that the Prohibition Era gave it
42
birth. Salerno and Tompkins note:
Any list of organized crime's heroes
tive Andrew J. Volstead and Benito
to each other, and without conscious
organization of crime in -the United

would have to rank RepresentaMussolini at the top. Unknown
intent they set the stage for the
States.

A second theory, one that never really caught on, traces its history to the
43
early gangs of the 19th century. Tyler enunciated this theory a decade ago:

40. CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 24.
41. R. SALERNO &J. TOMPKINS, supra note 36, at 392.
42. Id. at 275. Similarly: "[C]rime first got organized along modem business lines
during Prohibition. This development has been dearly documented, although the reasons
for it have been somewhat confused." Moynihan, The Private Government of Crime, 25 TnE
.REORTER, July 6, 1961, at 15.
43. G. TYLER, ORGANIZE CRIME IN AMmuCA 89 (1962). See also Tyler, An Interdisciplinary,Attack on Organized Crime, in Combating Organized Crime, 347 ANNALS, May 1963,

at 107-08 (spedal issue).
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Contrary to popular belief, organized crime did not begin with Prohibition.... Nor did "crime incorporated" begin with the highly publicized Mafia. . . The line of development from buccaneer to businessmen, from fisticuffs to finance parallels the contour of the American
economy. The binding tie from past to present is the very accurate
word "gangster."
Tyler's preoccupation with gangs 4 obscured his more penetrating observation concerning parallels in the American economy. Ordinarily, when
that possibility is raised, similarities are found in the turn-of-the-century
robber barons. Tyler recalls Jay Gould, Daniel Drew, and Commodore Vanderbilt, but only in terms of their relationship (as potential employers) to
his gang theory.4.5 If the focus is instead on illicit enterprises in the American economy, not simply on figures from the immediate past whose affairs
are characterized by dubious business practices and by the use of violence,
perhaps more useful referents will emerge. For example: Is the slave trade
one of the earliest examples of organized crime in America?
Originally, slavery was a legitimate business in the American Colonies. As
DuBois observed: "That the slave trade was the very life of the colonies had,
by 1700, become an almost unquestioned axiom in British practical economics."4 6 By 1774 under a combination of economic, moral, and patriotic
arguments the Continental Congress decided to prohibit the slave trade. In
the long run, the result of that action was an increase in demand for new
slaves and a rise in prices. During the Revolution, "smugglers made fortunes."47 Although the trade revived after the Revolutionary War, various

states enacted laws against it. The stalemate between Georgia and South Carolina, the only states with a flourishing slave trade,48 and the rest of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 made a national prohibition of the trade impossible. The compromise adopted was a provision
that -the importation of slaves could not be prohibited nationally before
1808.49
In the intervening period, additional state laws were passed and, beginning in 1794, federal legislation was enacted to restrict American engagement in international slave trade. By 1798 even the states that had
previously sanctioned slave trade prohibited it. In 1803, however, South Carolina reopened the traffic. One justification for that action was the state's
50
inability to enforce its law:
44. This preoccupation with gangs is illustrated by stories from New York, Chicago,
Denver, and San Francisco in the mid-1800's, as well as the tale of Wyatt Earp's capture of
the Thompson Brothers. G. TYLER, ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 96-146 (1962).
45. G. TYLER, supra note 43, at 90.
46. W. DuBois, THE SUsPRFssON OF THE ArRiCAN SLAvE TRADE TO =H UNrrED STATES
Or AMERcA 1638-1870, 4 (1896).
47. Id. at 48.
48. The slave trade was also legal in North Carolina, but with a prohibitive duty
applied. Id. at 69.
49. U. S. CONsr. art. V.
50. Speech by Rep. Lowndes of South Carolina, 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 733 (1804); W.
DuBois, supranote 46, at 85-86.
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With navigable rivers running into the heart of [the state], it was impossible, with our means, to prevent our Eastern brethren, who, in
some parts of the Union, in defiance of the authority of the General
Government, have been engaged in this trade, from introducing them
into the country. The law was completely evaded, and, for the last
year or two, Africans were introduced into the country in numbers
little short, I believe, of what they would have been had the trade been
a legal one.
The South Carolina action "led . . . to an irresistible demand for a na-

tional prohibitory act at the earliest possible moment;" 51 the Act of 1807
resulted. However, the Act was ineffective because no special machinery had
been provided for enforcement, and the appeal of profit was too strong for
entrepreneur and sympathetic (or venal) enforcement officer alike. Nor was
52
the appeal of illicit enterprise limited to the South:
When I was young, the slave trade was still carried on, by Connecticut
ship masters and Merchant adventurers, for the supply of Southern
ports. This trade was carried on by the consent of the Southern States,
under the provisions of the Federal Constitution, until 1808, and, after
that time, clandestinely. There was a good deal of conversation on the
subject, in private circles.
Supplemental acts for tighter enforcement were passed in 1818 and 1820,
but traffic in slaves was not successfully eliminated until slavery itself was
ended by the Civil War. In the intervening period, smuggling continued
with only sporadic and ineffective efforts to suppress it.
This brief review of circumstances suggests that the slave trade, at least
from 1808, was an organized criminal activity. It is also clear that the question of legality had little effect on the operation of the enterprise, other
than tactical adjustments (such as registration of vessels under foreign flags)
to avoid the unlikely possibility of prosecution. But legality aside, the slave
trade remained a force in the American economy even after it was outlawed.
What role did the slave trade play in the economic development of America? How was the illicitly derived development capital of the slave traders
absorbed into the economy? How were the slavers themselves, as illicit entrepreneurs, eventually absorbed into American life? Did the slavers attempt
to control all "legitimate economic and political activities," or to "influence
legislation," as Cressey fears today's organized criminals wish to do?53 Such

exploration of historic parallels may help illuminate effective strategies for
today's needs and, equally importantly, point to deficiencies in ineffective
strategies.
One cautionary note. It is easy to draw mistaken parallels from history,
especially when only some of the details of past events are known. Thus, before
drawing too many inferences from the history of illicit slave trading, the valid51. W. DuBois, supra note 46, at 72.
52.

W.

C.

FowLER, LOCAL LAW IN MASSACHUSErrs

AND

CONNECTICUT,

HISTORICALLY CON-

122-26 (1872) (quoted by W. DuBois, supra note 46, at 110).
53. D. CREssEY, supra note 1, at 2-3.

SIDERED

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/1

14

Smith: Some Things that May be More Important to Understand About Organi

1971]

UNDERSTANDING

ORGANIZED

CRIME

ity of apparent parallels must be considered carefully. Two contradictory condusions can be drawn. History in this case either demonstrates the futility of
prohibitory measures that do not rest on a sufficiently broad public consensus
or demonstrates the inexorable threat that immoral but lucrative practices pose to a moral society (the uncompromising stand of the slave traders
in the late 1700's did, after all, lay the seeds of the Civil War). Which conclusion should be drawn if the attempted parallel is between the slave trade
and gambling? It appears that the slave trade parallel can be used to support either side of the legalized gambling debate.
A focus on illicit enterprise may also justify cross-cultural comparisons.
Organized crime is conventionally viewed as an American phenomenon.

The growth of gambling casinos in the Bahamas and in Great Britain is
generally viewed as an example of American organized criminal activities
expanding into overseas ventures. 5 4 Illicit enterprise is not culturally circumscribed- all it appears to require is entrepreneurial skill and the willingness to exploit for illicit gain.r5 An exploration of the distinctions between illicit enterprise in this country and in others might suggest peculiar
vulnerabilities of the American economy that could be remedied.
A final advantage of this line of inquiry is the identification of a category of activities wider than the conventional description of organized crime
and more nearly inclusive of the modem-day illicit enterprises that do
threaten American life. Activities within the conventional spectrum do not
hold a monopoly on organized corrupt practices, extortion, black markets, or
racketeering. A concept that is inclusive of such activities will be more appropriate as a base for analysis and understanding.
What Is the Nature of the Task Environment of Illicit Enterprise?
Thompson has formulated an approach to organization theory that combines open system and dosed system strategies. 56 He conceives of complex
organizations "as open system, hence indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of rationality and hence
needing determinateness and certainty."57 Under these circumstances it is

advantageous for an organization to protect its technical core by reducing
the number of variables operating on it. Thompson speaks of the "task environment" of an organization as -those parts in its environment that are
"relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment";58

its

four principal sectors are customers, suppliers, competitors, and regulatory
groups. Within the task environment an organization seeks to establish its
domain, or the claims that it stakes out for itself -interms of a range of pro54. See, e.g., H. MsicK, SvaDncAT'E ABROAD (1969).
55. An example of non-American organized illicit enterprise is Antonio Moreno who
defrauded the French Social Security Administration to the extent of an estimated 80
million francs by registering 3,000 nonexistent children as recipients of family assistance.
Albany-Times-Union, Dec. 20, 1970, §A at 10, col. 1.
56.

J. THomusoN,

ORGANIZATIONS m AaoN (1967).

57. Id. at 10.
58. Id. at 27.
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ducts, the population served, and the services rendered. Most significantly,
5
Thompson points out:

9

Establishment of domain cannot be an arbitrary, unilateral action. Only
if the organization's claims to domain are recognized by those who can
provide the necessary support, by the task environment, can a domain
be operational. The relationship between an organization and its task
environment is essentially one of exchange, and unless the organization is judged by those in contact with it as offering something desirable, it will not receive the inputs necessary for survival .

. ..

The

specific categories of exchange vary from one type of organization to
another, but in each case ..

. exchange agreements rest upon prior con-

sensus regarding domain.
The task environment presents numerous constraints and contingencies
against which the core technology must be protected. To deal with such
exogenous variables, organizations create boundary-spanning components units with a principal responsibility of relating to the outside world.
There is a great deal more to Thompson's analysis than this brief introduction suggests. While one can readily concede that it applies to General
Motors, does it also apply to organized crime and other illicit enterprises?
It may say more about the phenomena under study than the prevailing
stereotypes, even though at first glance there appear to be problems with
events that are more predatory appearing than exchange appearing.60 It suggests that there may be more effective routes to the control of organized crime
than the "massive attrition" strategy of strike forces. And it raises questions
concerning scholarly approaches to the analysis of organized crime that depend too heavily on conventional stereotypes as a starting point.
Is there really a unique position of "corrupter" in the structure of organized crime, or is that simply the name that might be given to a boundaryspanning component that in legitimate businesses would be referred to as a
registered lobbyist? The functions are basically similar: to insure that the
powers of regulatory groups in the task environment -the legislature, the
iegulatory agency, and the judiciary-do not interfere unduly with the
organization's core technology. The distinctions between them have more
to do with the tools of the trade and the circumstances under which they
operate than with ultimate objectives. The lobbyist can appeal openly to
common values and shared political allegiances, and can offer nonmonetary
rewards such as recognition and acceptance in desirable social circles, whereas his counterpart in organized crime apparently must deal surreptitiously
and in terms of his only meaningful reward - money.
Recognizing the importance of the consumer in defining the task environment may also be important because it confronts the notion that organized
crime is an enterprise that stands by itself. This becomes significant when one
considers responses to organized crime. If it were a self-contained, basically
59.

Id. at 28.

60. See text accompanying note 10 supra. It suggested, for example, that Judge Weintraub's perception of the phenomena at issue may be better than he realizes.
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alien entity, it could be erased from the contemporary scene as political
leaders have promised to do. But is this possible? Would the "elimination"
of the individuals presently associated with organized crime also eliminate
the demand for gambling or for unsecured loans at excessive interest rates
or for narcotics?
In fairness to a good number of law enforcement personnel it should be
noted that the challenge here is to a doctrinaire assumption that is seldom
held in its pure form. The consumer's role in creating the demand for
organized crime is generally recognized in -the better police departments and
prosecutors' offices as well as in the serious literature. Cressey devotes the
major portion of one chapter to supply and demand, discussing the details
of gambling, loansharking, drugs, and black market labor.-' His attention
then shifts to a consideration of how the profits of organized crime activities
are reinvested in legitimate businesses, and the dangers that entail without
resolving the original question of the role of supply and demand in creating
opportunities for illicit enterprises. 62 One can only conclude that prior allegiance to the Mafia Conspiracy theory permitted no interference from contradictory notions that might emerge from a more complete analysis.
What Function Does Violence Perform in Illicit Enterprise, as Distinguished
from Its Function in the Economy Generally?
Violence is associated with the conventional view of organized crime, and
contemporary literature makes a conspicuous point of it - associating it with
extortion, loanshark collection, and the maintenance of order within organized crime groups. 3 Pathological violence, while not entirely passed, is certainly less frequent than in the days of Arthur Flegenheimer ("Dutch
Schultz") 4 and indiscriminate violence is not part of the regular organized
crime scene.
What is the function of violence? Is the function unique to organized
crime, or is it likely to occur in any illicit enterprise? Is there an equivalent
function in legitimate business? If there is a functional correspondence, it
may suggest new clues as to how violence within illicit enterprises may be
met. It would appear that the activities within organized crime that are
identified as "violence" might serve three principal functions: maintenance
of internal discipline; enforcement of market conditions; and control of
competition. The latter function was particularly evident during the 1920's
and 1930's, but was largely stabilized by a series of events that culminated
in the so-called "Castellammarese War" of 1930-1931.65

61. D. CRsEY, supra note 1, at 72-108.
62. Id. at 99-107.
63. See generally id. for examples of the identification and interpretation of "violence"
in the conventional literature of organized crime. See also R. SALERuo & J. TOMPKINs, supra
note 36.
64. See, e.g., Davis, Things I Couldn't Tell Till Now, CoUtrs, July 22, 1939, at 9,
quoted by D. CRESEY, supra note 1, at 179 (account of the murder of Jules Martin).
65. D. CasszY, supra note 1, at 35-49; R. SA.zaNo & J. TompKiNs, supra note 36, at

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

17

Florida Law
24, REVIEW
Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY
OF Review,
FLORIDAVol.
LAW

(Vol. XXIV

Cressey has suggested that one of the positions within the organization
structure of organized crime is that of the Enforcer, who "makes arrangements for injuring or killing members and, occasionally, nonmembers."6 6
He has interpreted the function of the Enforcer's violence in political terms.
The Enforcer is analogous to the prison official who makes arrangements for
imposing the death penalty. The presence of such a position indicates that
the code within which Cressey's Cosa Nostra operates "has been designed
to minimize the degree of conflict and to maximize the degree of conformity
among members." 67 It also indicates that there are legislative and judicial
processes through which "regularized expectations" (to use Gressey's phrase)
are set concerning the way conflict will be resolved within the organization.
The Grime Commission, on the other hand, suggests that violence has a
different purpose: enforcement "is necessary for the maintenance of both
8
In their
internal discipline and the regularity of business transactions."6
view, the "law" being applied is both criminal and commercial.
If the enforcer function -identified by Cressey is viewed within Thompson's task environment concept described earlier, 69 the business regulation
function proposed by the Crime Commission assumes greater importance.
If organized crime, as an illicit enterprise, operates by the same rules of
organizational dynamics that characterize legitimate enterprises, then its
principal internal concern is to protect its technical core from uncertainties
in the task environment.7 0 Stability in the market place may thus be a
stronger motive for controlling individual behavior than political fealty.
That assumption can be tested by considering the kinds of problems that
affect businesses of all kinds, both licit and illicit. Such a study indicates
that legitimate businesses do have problems similar to those of organized
crime. One of the most direct parallels appears between the bank and the
loanshark. The bank is an example of what Thompson calls a mediating
technology, or "the linking of clients and customers who are or wish to be
interdependent." 7' 1 With both multiple suppliers (depositors) and customers
2
(borrowers), the bank requires a high degree of standardization:7
The commercial bank must find and aggregate deposits from diverse
depositors; but however diverse the depositors, the transaction must
conform to standard terms and to uniform bookkeeping and accounting procedures. It must also find borrowers; but no matter how varied
their needs or desires, loans must be made according to standardized
criteria and on terms uniformly applied to the category appropriate

85-87. The principal historical source is Valachi. See P. MAAS, THE VALACHI PAPERS 83-112
(1968).
66. D. CRESSEY, supra note I, at 165. The role of "Enforcer" is described at length at

164-67.
67. Id. at 166.
68. CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added).
69. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
70. J. THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 19.
71. Id. at 16.
72. Id. at 16-17.
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to the particular borrower. Poor risks who receive favored treatment
jeopardize bank solvency.
The bank must be prepared for the borrower who cannot repay a loan.
Ultimately, its response will be to claim the collateral posted by the bor-

rower; this may entail foreclosing on personal or business property. The
bank's purpose in foreclosing is not simply to recover funds loaned in a
particular case, but also to insure that other borrowers will operate within
"regularized expectations" of the banking business. The individual defaul-

ter who receives favored treatment is not likely to jeopardize bank solvency
by himself; but if his treatment sets an example for other borrowers, solvency might well be endangered. The application of standard criteria for
both lending and collecting thus protects the stability of the mediating function Oinking lender and borrower) which is the bank's core technology.
The loanshark's task environment is much simpler. For all practical purposes he has only one supplier, either himself or his backer. Since he
operates outside banking laws, he has no responsibility to regulatory agendes. His only purpose in maintaining records is to protect the link between
his one supplier and multiple customers; he thus avoids the complexities
occasioned by the bank's accountability to multiple money suppliers and to
the regulators of banking activity. His major problems in protecting his
core technology relate to obtaining customers and ensuring loan repayment.
The loanshark may foreclose on property, as does a bank; but since he does
not have access to judicial authority his methodology is that of becoming
a silent partner in a legitimate business. 73 Alternatively, or in the absence
of other collateral and the unavailability of judicial remedies, he may resort to violence against the borrower. 4 As with the legitimate banker, his
purpose is not simply to recover any particular funds, but to set an example
for other borrowers. In this fashion, the long-term stability of the mediating
function is protected.
Legitimate businesses and organized crime also have comparable problems in personnel management. Particular parallels concern the overlyambitious subordinate and -the defector. If a legitimate enterprise cannot
reach an accommodation with the ambitious subordinate (promotion, transfer, reorganization and reassignment, or even reconciliation to a subordinate
role), that individual can be dismissed. He may leave with bitterness sufficiently hostile to push for a public airing of his version of the separation,
and his assessment of the company in general 74 Resulting publicity may be
distasteful -tothe enterprise, but as long as the employee does not reveal information that would affect the enterprise's competitive position, or does not
detail illegal practices, the core technology of -the enterprise will not be af-

73. See R. SALER'o & J. To mPrNs, supra note 36, at 235-42.
74. Id. at 397-402.
75. The recent litigation between the Hughes Tool Co. and Robert Maheu, former
manager of Howard Hughes' Nevada enterprim, wl.l.e c.lor:.e by t0e personal nature of
the Hughes' operation, is a case in point,
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fected. If necessary, the risks that might accompany such a separation can
be anticipated and defensive strategies devised.
A defector poses a more serious problem in a highly competitive industry
in which trade secrets lie at the heart of the core technology. Personnel
management in such a circumstance may become much more delicate, and
individual decisions may reflect the potential vulnerability of the core technology as much as the enterprise's need for a particular individual's competencies. Since stability of the market place (from the standpoint of the
enterprise) remains a paramount concern, such an industry may be characterized by active intelligence and counter-intelligence components, aimed in
part at reducing dependence of the enterprise on holders of "secrets," and
thus minimizing the risks that a defector might pose to its core technology.
The task environment of the illicit enterprise presents different problems.
Public revelations by the discharged employee or the defector cannot be
tolerated -the enterprise itself would then come under scrutiny by regulatory agencies. Survival of the illicit enterprise may then be at stake in a
more critical way than is the case with personnel matters in a legitimate
enterprise.
As these examples illustrate, drawing correct comparisons between legitimate businesses and illicit enterprises is a difficult task. The principal barrier lies in the differences in task environments, particularly regarding the
relationship between the illicit enterprise and regulatory groups. In the
legitimate business, regulating agencies monitor action and assist in applying
the "rules of the game" to the remainder of the task environment. To enforce those rules, a range of sanctions exists, many of which are economic in
nature. In the illicit enterprise, however, the regulatory agency is unable
to maintain the integrity of market activities: enterprises that are proscribed
at the outset can hardly be monitored to see that the "rules of the game"
are being followed. In these circumstances, the illicit enterprise has limited
alternatives. 76 While the core technology must be protected, the available
sanctions are personal, rather than economic. The individual, not his property, may be attacked.
Prevailing theories of organized crime interpret such a possibility as entirely "political," rather than "economic." The borrower who does not repay the loanshark appears to be defying the organization's avowed intention to control personal conduct; the employee who threatens stability is
presumed to be a political risk to the invisible government. The foundation
of this conclusion is an interpretation of 'the use of violence to serve the
same function of protecting the authority of the illicit organization as criminal sanctions perform in maintaining the authority of the state. As noted at
the outset of this discussion, the justification for viewing organized crime
as a political activity- as a government as well as a business- lies in the

76. The limited alternatives of an illicit enterprise may be comparable to the options
of a vigilante group. For a discussion of those limitations see J. CAuGHEY, THEIR MAJESTIES THE MOB 13-17 (1960).
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role of the Enforcer being analogous to the prison official, a "political" officer,
whose function in turn implies legislative and judicial activity within the
organization. On the other hand, if the basic decision being made is protection of the business enterprise, not simply survival of an organization and
its feudal chief who enunciates and interprets the organization's code of
behavior,"7 then perhaps the assumption that organized crime is an "invisible government" should be reassessed. In 'that-reassessment, what would
be the relationship between the activites associated conventionally with
organized crime, and other illicit enterprises? Is the use of violence common
to other enterprises, or is the function of maintaining economic stability
carried out -in some other fashion? Further investigation might indicate varying alternatives in the application of sanctions, just as there are likely to be
variations in the spectrum of illicit entdrprise.
Further investigation might also reveal that a shift away from violent
self-regulation has been occurring since the end of World War 11.78 If this
is the case, it may be useful to consider what has prompted that transition.
It may be that violence was necessary in the past because market stability
was based on the fear it engendered. Perhaps it is fair to ask today whether
illicit enterprises survive because they are feared, or because they are useful,
or because they have become necessary. If utility or necessity is replacing
fear -and if this change in values is more than just rationalization of a
weak power position relative to illicit enterprise - then perhaps grounds
exist for a reexamination of the legal distinctions between lict and illicit
behavior.
Finally, further investigation might reveal that the so-called position
of "Enforcer" has become obsolete. The decrease in violence may be a signal
of that. The role of enforcement -monitoring action and assisting in applying the "rules of the game," may be increasingly assumed by law enforcement. Judicial remedies are available to the illicit entrepreneur in at least
one significant way - the maintenance of a monopoly position; competitors
can be "turned in." One can assume that a law enforcement agency would
appreciate information leading to a successful arrest. The continuing competition for the Harlem numbers racket suggests that it may be profitable to
eliminate a competitor;7 9 the fact that arrests help regulate the illicit market
place is incidental, from the standpoint of the arresting agency, to the fact
that action is taken against persons who are violating the law. The fact that
both the illicit entrepreneur and -the law enforcement officer "benefit" from

77. See D. CRssy, supra note 1, at 186: "The code of honor and silence which asks
every member of Cosa Nostra to be a 'stand-up guy,' and which underlies the entire
structure of the criminal cartel and confederation, performs the same important function
that the 'rule of law' once performed for absolute monarchs- it protects the personal power
of the rulers."
78. See, e.g., note 38 supra.
79. Some of the circumstances of this competition are noticed in Grutzver, Cubans Here
Are Ending Mafia's Monopoly on Numbers Raichet, .with20% of City Play. N.Y, Times,
Feb. 22, 1970, at 86, col. 2.
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such circumstances suggests that a symbiotic relationship between them may
be a more accurate analogy than the conventional view of organized crime
as a "malignant parasite.s 0
A further exploration of this alternative might reveal that the violence
historically associated with the Italian-dominated syndicate crime of the
1920's and the 1930's was not so much an essential attribute of the enterprise being developed as it was a misreading of the real nature of law enforcement in this country by immigrants from a different law enforcement
setting. Once the role of law enforcement as a regulator of the black market
was better understood, reliance on self-regulation quickly dropped off. By
way of comparison, the success of the illicit slave trade a century earlier
certainly seems to have had little need for violence as a means of controlling
the market place; the violence associated with trading activities (as distinct
from the violence of slavery itself) was directed at the problem of inventory
control that was peculiar to an enterprise dealing in human beings as objects of trade.
Judicial remedies may also be available indirectly for control of the customer. The power of the narcotics distributor over the addict-pusher is more
than just the junkie's dependence on the narcotics; that dependency is also
a potential basis for turning the noncooperative pusher over to the police.
A less direct, but equally useful, weapon may be present in some loanshark
arrangements. The loanshark is interested in maintaining a hold over his
debtor. He may not have access to the courts to enforce the express conditions
of his loan; but if the customer is engaged in questionable activities those
activities can be the basis for "punishing" or penalizing the uncooperative
customer.81
It may also be that other means of enforcement are available beyond that
of violence or recourse to the courts. The loanshark may be able to use the
fear of exposure without the need for other forms of pressure. That "punishment" also need not be related directly to the circumstances of the entrepreneurial arrangement between borrower and lender; other social or economic
conditions not directly related to the loan may create a sufficient position of
vulnerability.
What Function Does Corruption Perform in Illicit Enterprise, as
Distinguished from its Function in the Economy Generally?
To a greater extent than violence, corruption is considered a hallmark
of organized crime. The Crime Commission believed it to be an essential
attribute: "All available data indicate that organized crime flourishes only
80.

"[Organized

crime] is a malignant parasite which fattens on human weakness."

OYSTER BAY CONFERENCES ON COMBATrING ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT, COMBATrING ORGANIZED

CRIME 19 (1965).
81. For example, the gambler who needs the services of a loanshark may not be
reporting his correct income to tax agencies. Threatening to anonymously supply such information to the Internal Revenue Service may impel prompt payment.
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where it has corrupted local offidals."s 2 Corruption can occur in any element of criminal justice administration, and at any level, with public officials "whose legitimate exercise of duties would block organized crime and
' 3
whose illegal exercise of duties helps it."
Corruption and graft are not exclusive prerogatives of organized crime;
consequently, it may be useful to distinguish between organized, sustained,
and systematic corruption aimed at creating a favorable climate for illicit
enterprise, and individual instances of bribery aimed at obtaining favorable
resolution of a particular governmental matter. The latter may have been
what Sufrin meant when he wrote that "under some circumstances graft may
play a positive role in modifying an administrative structure in line with
rationality and, perhaps, even public morality."84 He observed that practical
levels of behavior- despite "deep moral sentiments of society"-do not always present a clear choice between what is morally right and wrong; and
that the differing criteria of the political market vis-a-vis the economic market may well lead to conflicts between desirable political behavior (through
administrative rulings and legal enactments) and their intended economic
effects. The more complex the bureaucracy, the more complex the transactions and the greater the likelihood of incompatibility. Thus, circumstances
may arise in which the only effective way to achieve a desirable economic
end is through an act of graft. In such circumstances, the most useful question may be: "What would the government or business have done in the
8' 5
absence of graft?"
In contrast, the focus here is on deliberate and continuous efforts to deflect the application of law to illicit enterprises. Once again, the questions
to be asked concern the function of corruption in organized crime, its uniqueness, if any, to that form of enterprise, and the functional parallels that
may exist with legitimate business. Generally, the function of corruption
is to see that legal sanctions that might otherwise stop the illicit enterprise,
or penalize the entrepreneur, are not brought into play. In the discussion
that ordinarily follows, a semantics problem emerges that may appear
precious, but is important in setting the context within which the significance of organized crime is to be assessed: Should the function of corruption
be referred to as an effort to nullify, or as an effort to neutralize law enforcemeint and the political process? This question arises because the Crime
Commission used both words in describing the activities of organized crime.
In its introductory statement, the Commission spoke of nullification:s6
The purpose of organized crime is not competition with visible, legal
government but nullification of it. When organized crime places an

82.
83.
84.
at 30.
85.
86.

CRmE COMMISSiON, supra note 1, at 6.
Id.
Sufrin, Graft: Grease for the Palm and Grease for the Wheels,

CHALLENGE,

Oct. 1964,

Id. at 81.
CR= COMMISSION,

supra note 1, at 2.
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official in public office, it nullifies the political process. When it bribes
a public official, it nullifies law enforcement.
When it turned to the issue of corruption, the Commission switched its
terminology: 87
Neutralizing local law enforcement is central to organized crime's operations. What can the public do if no one investigates the investigators, and the political figures are neutralized by their alliance with
organized crime?
Cressey noted the problem of corruption by suggesting that "any citizen
purchasing illicit goods and services from organized criminals contributes
to a culture of fraud, corruption, violence, and murder."88 His analysis of
corruption focused on internal questions of structure and authority, rather
than function; consequently, his concern for the Crime Commission centered on identification of the positions of "Corrupter" and "Corruptee" within organized crime. Their function appears ,to have been of secondary
importance, noted simply by the observations that corruption is required
to keep illicit businesses in operation, and that "the position of 'Corrupter'
is as essential to an illicit business as the position of 'negotiator' is to a
labor union."' 9
His subsequent book devoted greater attention to corruption. 90 His exposition of the problem began with an elaboration of the Crime Commission's orginal statement: 91
Cosa Nostra functions as an illegal invisible government. However,
its political objective is not competition with the established agencies
of legitimate government. Unlike the Communist Party, it is not interested in political and economic reform. Its political objective is a
negative one: nullification of government.
He further asserted that nullification is directed at both the law enforcement process (bribing a policeman) and the political process (bribing a politician), and that potential harm today is greater than ever before "simply
because nullification of government today means nullification of a broader
range of regulatory activity."92 The method is simple: "Corrupters nullify
the law enforcement and political processes primarily by outright bribery
and other rationally designed forms of 'influence' . . . ... 93 In this fashion,
87. Id. at 6.
88. D. CRxssxy, supra note 1, at 1.
89. Cressey, The Functions and Structure of Criminal Syndicates, in CRIME COMMISSION,
supra note 1, at 59.
90. D. CRSSEY, supra note I, at at 248-89.
91. Id. at 248. Other observers have taken similar "political" approaches: "[I]n effect
organized crime constitutes a private government whose power rivals and often supplants
that of elected public government." Moynihan, supra note 42, at 15 n.39.
92. D. CREEY, supra note 1, at 250.
93. Id. at 271.
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Cressey adopted the Crime Commission's line of thought through the consistent use of nullify and abandonment of the idea of neutralize.
The difference between them, in careful usage, denotes a difference in
context. "Nullification" relates to the reversal or abolition of a legal entity,
the most famous use of the concept in American history being John Calhoun's efforts to abolish the tariff of 1828 - the "tariff of abominations."
Thus, when the Crime Commission observed that "the purpose of organized
crime is... nullification" of government, it was suggesting an intention to
have government void and inoperative. The concept of "neutralization," on
the other hand, refers to modification of a process though which policy
is implemented. When the Crime Commission observed that "neutralizing
local law enforcement is central to organized crime's operation," it was suggesting a mere desire that the law not be enforced in certain circumstances.
These are rather different goals for an enterprise to pursue.
If organized crime is viewed within the context of Thompson's task environment, 94 it becomes clear that illicit enterprise would be handicapped
by an inoperative government. Strong regulatory agencies can be used effectively to protect or increase one's domain at the expense of potential competitors. From the standpoint of the illicit businessman, the regulatory agency
has a useful function to perform in helping to maintain stability in the market place of a black market enterprise. As Schelling put it: "Without the
law and some degree of enforcement, there is no presumption that the monopoly organization can survive competition." 95 It may be significant that the
major documented efforts to describe organized crime all refer to Commissioner Thom's 1960 testimony before the New York State Investigations
Commission:96
[T]he syndicates are particularly happy with the consolidation of the
nine police departments into the Suffolk County Police Department,
as 'they feel that protection is easier to arrange through one agency
than through many. [An intensive anti-gambling campaign] had the
astounding side effect of solving -the recruitment problems of the syndicate, as our drive successfully stampeded the independents into the
arms of the syndicate for protection and the syndicate can now pick
and choose those operators they wish to admit.
This observation illustrates how corruption can take place, and how it
may be helpful to the illicit enterprise. However, its deeper significance is
usually overlooked. The entrepreneur, whether engaged in organized crime
or in more conventional enterprise, may wish to manipulate or use government to his advantage, but he would much prefer to have a government,
rather than no government.
94. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
95. Schelling, Economic Analysis of Organized Crime,'in CQsaE COMMISSION, supra note
1, at 123.
96. Thom, Statement Before the New York Commission of Investigation on April 22,
1960, at 2 (mimeographed). See also D. CR-ssEv, supra note 1, at 76-77; CrimE CoMMISSION,
supra note 1, at 3; R. SALERNO & J.Topmmus, THE Cam CONrznATION 244 (1969).
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If one wishes to gain a better understanding of the functioning of illicit
enterprise in contrast to legitimate business (the objective presumably being better control of the former and better protection of the latter), it may
be helpful to understand why the discussion of corruption focuses on nullification. On the surface, nullification may be more useful to the advocate
wishing to drive home the magnitude of the organized crime threat, since it
is a more threatening word than neutralization. Public support for organized
crime control might be strengthened by such an escalation in vocabulary. A
more important reason, however, may be the need to differentiate dearly
between organized crime and other entrepreneurial activities. As Cressey
suggested at the beginning of his analysis: "The threat of organized crime
in America is similar to the threat any potential monopolizer poses to a
small businessman." 9 This observation poses an immediate question: Why
pick on organized crime instead of "potential monopolizers?" Cressey responded by noting two differences: the use of force and the effort to nullify
government.98 But they turn out, even with attention directed at nullification, not to be real differences at all: "[O]rganized crime uses force and
threat of force to obtain monopoly, while legitimate firms do not, at least not
as often . . . organized crime nullifies legitimate government more directly,
99
and to a greater extent, than do other forms of monopoly."
The justifiication for concentrating on eliminating organized crime must
rest on a showing that it does undesirable or dangerous things that other
enterprises do not. "Nullification" does ithis in part, by suggesting a level
of political competition, rather than simply economic competition. This is
the significance of Cressey's reference to the "illegal invisible government;"
his assertion that it is only an alternative political approach and not a
competitive one (as, he suggests, is the Communist Party) has an appeal that
does not hold up under close analysis. If, on the other hand, organized crime
is primarily concerned with stabilizing an illicit market place to its advantage, a goal that the neutralization of law enforcement would facilitate, then
its character and aspirations are not that different from any other economic
enterprise. If its principal motives are more economic than political, the
similarities noted earlier between the corrupter and the registered lobbyist
may be more useful than the distinctions between them.
When the problem of assessing the basic intent of illicit enterprise vis-hvis law enforcement is presented in this fashion, a further question emerges as
to whether either "neutralization" or "nullification" is an appropriate view
of the matter. In the previous discussion concerning violence in illicit enterprises, it was suggested that the relationship between those enterprises
and law enforcement may be symbiotic; if this is correct, the conventional
interpretations of corruption may also need to be reassessed. As an indication of the direction that further analysis might take, it may be noted that
"co-optation" may be a more useful way to describe the objectives of both

97. D. CRsszy, supra note 1, at 7.
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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law enforcement and -the illicit enterprise. One of the implications inherent
in this approach is that the initiative for transactions between them - the
exchanges of money usually identified as bribery or corruption-may come
from either side. The law enforcement officer who proposes or demands a
pay-off may be guilty of selfish, venal activity; 100 but there may also be circumstances in which there is a higher social value to be gained by assisting
in regulating the illicit market place than could be reached by attempting to
suppress that market place entirely. It is this circumstance that Schelling
seems to have had in mind when he spoke of "compromising" with organized
crime:101

Aside from the approved negotiations by which criminals are induced
to testify, to plead guilty, to surrender themselves, and to tip off the
police, there is undoubtedly sometimes a degree of accommodation
between the police and the criminals - tacit or explicit understandings
analogous to what in the military field would be called the limitation
of war, the control of armament, and the development of spheres of
influence.
The negotiating process need not involve -the exchange of money or other
items of value. Regardless of the arrangements made, the end result remains
a relationship definable as a "corrupt practice." When one looks at corruption, however, rather than looking solely at organized crime, it appears to
have a more general utility than simply maintaining the enterprises of organized crime. Is it an attribute of illicit enterprise generally? Is it a function
associated only with governmental activities (obviously, it is not limited
to the standard grouping of law enforcement agencies), or is it also useful,
as Sufrin suggests graft may be, in the "purely private transaction"?-2 Has
the focus of organized crime served, in practical terms, as a diversion from
the real issue?103 Perhaps most importantly, what remedies can be adopted
to reduce corruption? If it is so vital to illicit enterprise, direct attack on
the function itself might be more effective than a direct attack on the enter-

prise.
Curiously enough, serious contemporary publications say much about
controlling organized crime, but little about controlling corruption. The
discussion of corruption is extensive; but it is more descriptive than reme-

100. "[A]fter a while, the shakedown gets to be part of the everyday budget --going into
the mortgage, the car payments, and the dentist bills for the kids-and the greedy few
start looking for assignments in those units, like gamblin& where they can really rake it in."
Burnham, How Corruption Is Built into the System-and a Few Ideas for what To Do
About It. Nrw YoRK, Sept. 21, 1970, at 30.

101. Schelling, supra note 95, at 12. D. CaRssn,, supra note 1, at 322-24, uses this
theme as the basis for his concluding comments. See also Cressey's comments at 260-63

concerning "the issuing and policing of illegal licenses."
102. Sufrin, supra note 84, at 31.
103. Most discussions of this point of view see organized crime as a scapegoat for
anger, distress, and anxiety concerning the crime scene. See N. Moams & G. HIwKms, TBE

HoNwr PoLrmcrAm's Gumn TO CanE CONTROL 232-33 (1970). In an earlier vintage, see Bell,
Crime as an American Way of Life, 13 Tin Aimos REv. 131, 144 (1953).
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dial, and it abounds with case histories, not recommended solutions. For
example, the Crime Commission was particularly concerned because it
recognized that as governmental regulation expands, the opportunities to
corrupt, and corruption's potential effect on the ordinary citizen and the
legitimate business, will expand accordingly.104 The Commission concluded
that although the extent of corruption was impossible to measure, it surely
existed, and that it needed to be controlled. 05 The problem of corruption
was subsequently mentioned only three times in connection with the Commission's twenty-two recommendations, and then almost in passing.106 It was

not mentioned at all in the recommendations emerging from other matters
investigated by the Commission. Concerning the formation of organized
crime intelligence units in offices of state attorneys general and local police
departments, the Commission observed that state-wide agencies might undertake investigation and action in areas "where . . . law enforcement
agencies are not adequately combatting organized crime," and that this
should be done without local knowledge "if, because of apparent corruption,
it is necessary."107 In connection with the desirability of increased news coverage of organized crime, the Commission recommended that coverage of
organized crime activities include reports on "the corruption caused by
it .... ."108 Concerning regular briefings of government officials about organized crime, the Commission noted that "enforcement against organized
crime and accompanying public corruption proceeds with required intensity
only when the political leaders in Federal, State, and local governments provide aggressive leadership. "109 It noted further that the reporting process
should be sensitive to problems of corruption: "[R]eports should be withheld from jurisdictions where corruption is apparent and knowledge by a
corrupt official of the information in the report could compromise enforcement efforts."1 0 Additionally:Public fears of reporting organized crime conditions to apparently
corrupt police and government personnel must also be met directly.
If an independent agency for accepting citizen grievances is established, it should be charged with accepting citizen complaints and information about organized crime and corruption.
The Commission's concern for protection of intelligence information is
commendable. But if corruption is the sine qua non of organized crime, as
the Commission asserted at the outset, it is surprising that more direct
action against corruption was not suggested. On the other hand, considering
the Commission's initial view of organized crime, the absence of recommenda104.

CRIME COMMISSION,

supra note 1, at 6.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 24.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id. at 24.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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tions against corruption may not be surprising. The Commission began by
looking at a specified group of enterprises, a particular group of persons
held responsible for them, and the quasi-political organization they had apparently created. The enterprises themselves were not the Commission's concern;- 2 rather, its focus was on the perpetrators and their organization,
which "is dedicated to subverting not only American institutions, but the
very decency and integrity that are the most cherished attributes of a free
society."11' 3 Their solution to the problem of organized crime seemed to lie
in attacking the organization itself. If the Commission had been concerned
instead with illicit enterprise generally, perhaps it would have noted that
decency and integrity are under attack from corrupt practices, not simply
from organized crime, and that the preservation of American institutions
depends on a effective program to control corruption.
If the Commission had not been concerned primarily with the persons who
perpetrate organized crime, perhaps the relationship of Corrupter and Corruptee would have been better understood. They require each other, as
Cressey pointed out -but at whose initiative? Conventional organized crime
theory assumes that organized criminals generally take the initiative in governmental relations; but this may not always be the case. The definition of
corruption places initiative on the entrepreneur as destroying integrity, or
causing one to be dishonest; with graft, however, attention shifts to the
public servant who enriches himself through the abuse of position. In either
event, a reciprocal act is undertaken; but conventional strategies of organized
crime control emphasize an attack on a limited set of entrepreneurs. One
might ask, within the context of the cost-effectiveness approach noted earlier,114 whether organized crime control would have been further advanced
at this time if, for example, the energies of the last five years devoted to
obtaining legal sanctions for wiretapping had been directed instead at obtaining better controls over corrupt practices.
CONCLUSION

The questions considered in the previous section do not constitute an
entire, integrated theory. In testing the approach they identify, and in suggesting alternative ways of remedying the problems they are intended to
explain, other areas of investigation may prove helpful. As a sketch, only, of
the nature of such other matters, the following questions can be posed:
What are the forces that have shaped illicit enterprise in America?
Are the "dangers" that might be associated with illicit enterprise
located in the enterprise itself, or in the consequences of its activities?

112. "It is organized crime's accumulation of money, not the individual transactions
by which the money is accumulated, that has a great and threatening impact on America."

Id. at 2.
113. Id.at 24.
114. See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

29

30

Florida Law
Review, Vol.
24,REVIEW
Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 1
LAW
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA

[Vol. XXIV

What are the characteristics of the entrepreneur who concentrates his
activities in the illicit sector of the economy?
What has been the relationship between the development of illicit
enterprise and economic development generally?
Are the illicit enterprises conventionally associated with "organized
crime" more concerned with making maximum, short-range profits, or
with perpetuating a stable market place?
The propositions advanced in this article rest on two fundamental assumptions: that enterprise in this country takes place across a continuous
range of behavior, from very saintly to very sinful, and that the concept of
a "task environment" is applicable to that entire range of behavior. When
the phenomena we conventionally categorize as "organized crime" are viewed
against those two assumptions, and apart from the stereotyped references to
Italian-dominated syndicate crime, it seems plausible that an alternate theoretical base would have validity: a theory of illicit enterprise. Our attention
should be directed toward the development of that theory.
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